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During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Prairie Communists made their most conspicuous attempt to 
convert the Western farmers to revolutionary socialism. Their objective was to channel the growing conflict 
between the non-competitive small farmers and the emerging industrial producers along class-conscious lines. 
Restricted, however, by the demands of the International and by the Toronto-based executive of the Party, the 
Prairie Communists failed to develop either a programme or a local leadership which might win the support of 
smal/farmers.lnfailing to gain ideological and organizational legitimacy, rural communism condemned itself 
to remain a tool of the militant conservatism of the marginal producers. 
C' est a Ia fin des annees 1920 et au debut de Ia decennie suivante que les communistes des Prairies ont 
tente le p/usfortement de convaincre /esfermiers de /'Ouest et de les rallier au socialisme revolutionnaire. Leur 
but etait de ramener a Ia question de Ia lutte des classes /e conjlit grandissant entre les petits fermiers et les pro-
ducteurs industriels, coriflit engendre porIa misere des unset/' emergence des autres. Neanmoins, retenus par 
/' lnternationa/e et par Ia direction du parti situee a Toronto, les communistes des Prairies ne purent ni lancer 
un programme politique ni mettre sur pied une direction regionale qui auraient pu leur valoir /' appui des petits 
fermiers. En manquant des' implanter, tant sur le plan ideologique qu' organisationnel, le communisme rural 
s' est ainsi condamne a ne rester qu' un instrument du conservatisme militant des producteurs marginaux. 
In the first volume of Capital, Marx wrote that "in the sphere of agriculture, modem 
industry has a more revolutionary effect than elsewhere ... it eliminates the peasant, that 
bulwark of the old society, and replaces him with the wage labourer ... The irrational, old-
fashioned methods of agriculture are replaced with scientific ones. Capitalism completely 
tears asunder the old bond of union which held together agriculture". In Canada, this 
capitalization process was as disruptive of agriculture as in Europe. Though there was no 
North American peasant class, the impact of mechanization and rural depopulation on a 
people nurtured on the free land myth was revolutionary. Just as industrialization in an wban 
setting created deep social tensions and conflicts between classes and within classes, so 
too did it transform perceptions and relationships in the agrarian context. The chief man-
ifestation of this dynamic was the real and relative decline in the size of the farm population, 
coupled with a radical increase in the dimensions and outputs of the remaining production 
units. The psychological result of this process was rural dissent. Admittedly, agricultural 
and wban capitalism were differentiated by the fact that, unlike the worker, the farmer was 
both owner and labourer, capitalist and proletarian. To this extent, the industrialization of 
agriculture was a self-directed process; the farmer chose to mechanize and accepted the 
costs of that decision. But not all agriculturalists in Western Canada enjoyed the same 
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opportunities. For most producers, mechanization was impossible, either because their land 
was unsuitable, or costs were too high. Some simply did not recognize the need for change. 
Eventually, those who failed to adapt to the industrial mode of production lost their holdings. 
Between 1930 and 1960, over half of the farmers on the Prairies gave up farming and left 
the land. 
Historians generally have not concerned themselves with the rural economy or its 
influence upon farm protest. Though there have been many studies of Western agrarian 
dissent, there have been few attempts to link the farmer's political vision with his changing 
socio-economic position. Students of Canadian communism have been among the most 
urban and elitist in their disposition. Ivan Avakumovic's investigations of the Communist 
Party's associations with the Prairie farmers reflect this bias. Unable to admit that a 
"propertied class" could be drawn to communism, Avakumovic underestimates the extent 
of Party support and dryly dismisses the Farmers' Unity League as a minor sectarian or-
ganization directed from Moscow. Studies of the radical left have tended to perceive mass 
protest from an elitist perspective. Norman Penner, for example, describes the Communist 
Party as a "rigid military-like apparatus", successfully "controlling all the activities of 
its members, subordinating them to the higher committees ... making no allowances for 
adaptability to different ... traditions and cultures.'' While this is a reasonably accurate 
depiction of what the Party wanted to be, it is dangerous to make assumptions about actions 
on the basis of the policy-statements of the leadership. As Theodore Draper once put it, 
though "the party demanded complete, unconditional adherence to its full program from 
its members, relatively few gave it that total commitment in theory, and fewer still in 
practice." Just as it now seems vital for agricultural historians to return to the farm, so too 
is it important for students of Canadian radicalism to focus in on the radicals. There is far 
more to the story of rural dissent than marketing structures, crop prices and foreign agitators. 
Revolutionary socialism has enjoyed a varied existence among the farmers of 
Western Canada. It emerged from a confluence of two distinct streams: one comprised of 
Saskatoon-based free lance radicals, and another made up of purely local talent. The latter 
was concentrated in the Sturgis area of Saskatchewan, where a farm worker named Shannon 
introduced his employer, Fred Ganong, to socialism in the pre-war period. Ganong had 
taken immediately to Marxism and, along with his brother Ottie and some of their neigh-
bours, had organized a socialist debating club. When Louis McNamee brought the militant 
Farmers' Union of Canada (FUC) to Sturgis in the summer of 1923, the tiny group of home-
grown revolutionaries took charge of the local, and for the next three years they formed 
the backbone of the farm movement in the area. 1 In Alberta, the spread of communism 
was largely the work of Carl Axelson, a former wobbly from the U.S. who had settled on 
a small farm near Bingville. A handsome though unstable agitator, Axelson had used a 
dramatic endorsement of the contract wheat pool as a pitch for his first appearance at the 
1923 Convention of the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA). 2 Within the year he had been 
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joined by John Glambeck, a Dane who had come to socialism via the Postal Clerks' Union 
in Chicago, and together they set about advertising agrarian socialism through the medium 
of a Progressive Farmers' Educational League (PFEL)-3 Originally, neither the Sturgis 
group nor the PFEL had any direct contact with the Communist Party (CPC); their phi-
losophy was one of praxis, differing from that of the mass of farmers only in the tone of 
their propaganda and the aggressiveness of their tactics. 4 
The Saskatoon-based socialists were a more diverse and cosmopolitan collection. 
Some, like H.M. Bartholomew and Ben Lloyd, were professional radicals who had been 
prominent in the Socialist Party of Canada. 5 Others, such as George Stirling, traced their 
Marxist roots to the Non-Partisan League. A final group, which organized itself into the 
"Economic and Educative Committee of the FUC", under the leadership of Ernie Bolton 
and J. W. Robson, was comprised of proto-social creditors who believed that communism 
could be achieved by nationalizing banking and credit. 6 Like their Sturgis-based com-
patriots, these Saskatoon radicals found their way into the Farmers' Union, quickly 
emerging as a powerful force within the movement. 
The Farmers' Union of Canada was an organization divided. Originally a movement 
of militant debt-ridden farmers, the Union began to change after its unsuccessful campaigns 
on behalf of a contract wheat pool in 1923 and 1924. In those years, a new group of farmers, 
drawn largely out of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association, entered the organi-
zation. These farmers were financially more secure than were the Union's original members, 
and consequently, less interested in a radical response to the debt problem. "Two schools 
of thought" thus began to develop, one favouring the continuation of militant struggle 
against the banks and mortgage companies, the other opting for a moderate response which 
emphasized debt adjustment rather than debt amortization. As entry of new members into 
the FUC meant expansion, to many in the Farmers' Union, the solution to the escalating 
conflict between these two views was not difficult to find. If the FUC were going to become 
powerful it had to become a "solid one hundred percent organization," which could appeal 
to all elements in the farm population. 7 This required disproving the common belief that 
the "mentality behind the Farmers' Union of Canada was Communistic and promised 
nothing but evil. " 8 In mid-1924 Lou McNamee, the loud and autocratic president of the 
FUC, turned on the radicals and announced that socialism was just "damn fool work. " 9 
In August, McNamee forbade Hugh Bartholomew to speak at FUC lodges, and by year's 
end he had expelled both him and the leading socialist on the Union's executive, N.H. 
Schwarz, from the organization. A. C. Weaver, the editor of the Union's newsletter si-
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multaneously turned on the "Economic and Educative Committee" and announced that 
"it had no right to misrepresent the Union cause." 1be real problem, as both Weaver and 
McNamee realized, was that prosperous farmers were hostile to the socialist message. Since 
this was the very element which the leadership was trying to attract into the movement, 
Marxism was ''making impossible Union organization for the future.'' 10 In both the Regina 
Leader and The Winnipeg Free Press, McNamee denounced socialism and confidently 
predicted that the radical element in the movement would be ''smashed''. 11 
Saskatchewan socialists met these developments with confusion. Disunified and 
isolated from each other, they were unable to challenge the attacks of the Union's leaders. 
Despite their professed skill at "boring from within", the radicals were incapable not only 
of resisting the conservative offensive, but also of preventing the 1925 merger of the FUC 
and the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association. 12 1be socialists organized too slowly. 
In the summer of 1925, they formed a Farmers' Political Association to aetas a lobby group 
within the new United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) [UFC (SS)]. The Po-
litical Association represented a broad fusion of social democrats, such as George Williams 
and Lewis Gabriel, Sturgis communists, like Walter Wiggins and George King, and the 
Saskatoon radicals, Bartholomew, Lloyd, Stirling and Schwarz. 13 The goal of the As-
sociation was similar to that of the PFEL in Alberta; it sought to unify all left-wing elements 
and to prevent the moderates from "directing the farmers into the hands of their class 
enemies ... merchants, lawyers, bankers and the like." 14 To implement this programme, 
the radicals moved to transform The Furrow, a broadsheet founded in February, 1926, as 
an organ for the nascent Saskatchewan hog pool, into a mouthpiece for agrarian dissent. 15 
The Saskatchewan radicals' higher profile brought them to the attention of a Toronto-
based group determined to direct left-wing activity across the Dominion. For some time, 
the Communist Party of Canada had been under pressure from the Comintern to develop 
an agrarian programme that would conform to the agricultural line delineated by Lenin at 
the Second Congress of the International in August, 1920. 16 The CPC's first agrarian 
programme had been adopted in 1923, but for several years the Party had done little more 
than propose unfulfillable resolutions. 17 Finally, with the appearance of a unified left-wing 
under the auspices of the Political Association and the PFEL, the CPC roused itself from 
its slumbers and in the summer of 1925 moved to press radicalism into its prefabricated 
mold. The Party's policy was to manage local socialist activity and subordinate each in-
dividual group to the Toronto decision-making apparatus. To accomplish this task, the Party 
began assisting the Sturgis group and the PFEL. The leverage gained through this financial 
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17. PAC, Communist Party of Canada (CPC) Papers, Convention Series, contains minutes of the annual 
conventions of the CPC. See the records of "The Third National Convention of theW .P.C. ", 18 April 1924. 
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and organizational support, enabled the CPC to press the Political Association into a merger 
with the Educational League. Unity alone was not sufficient, however, for the Party was 
anxious to direct agrarian radicalism along the lines dictated by the International. According 
to the Comintem' s ''Thesis on the Agrarian Question'', communist agitation was to identify 
the class struggle inherent in agricultural production. The object was to reveal the four-
fold division of small and middle peasantry, agricultural proletariat and Kulaks, and to 
promote the union of the poorer elements with the urban proletariat. This, it was stated, 
could only be achieved "by persuading the middle peasantry to maintain a neutral attitude 
and by gaining the support of a large part, if not the whole, of the small peasantry. ·· 18 Un-
fortunately, the local radical elite rejected the Party's line on the agrarian struggle. Hugh 
Bartholomew, who as editor of The Furrow had become the de facto leader of the radical 
fringe, had already reached his own conclusions on the character of rural capitalism. 
Bartholomew attempted to base the left-wing's policies upon the conflict "between agrarian 
capital and industrial capital, rather than upon the class struggle on the farm.'' 19 A for-
midable theoretician and a loyal Communist Party member, Bartholomew nonetheless 
rejected the notion of a divided countryside and insisted that the ''overwhelming mass of 
farmers'' shared the interests of the proletariat because debt had alienated them from their 
land. In fact, ''they are completely divorced from the land they till though that divorcement 
is still concealed from their eyes by fictitious land titles ... they have actually been reduced 
to the level of landless peasants and are completely at the mercy of finance capital. " 20 
Obviously, if the CPC was going to establish its control over Western farm radicalism, 
the editorial policy of The Furrow had to be changed. 
To achieve the ideological cohesion it desired, the CPC secured a letter of resignation 
from Bartholomew and contracted J.M. Clarke to move from Vancouver, "much against 
his will", into the editorial office of The Furrow. 21 A shy, awkward young Scot who had 
earned his reputation for being a loyal Leninist while serving as secretary of the Lumber 
Workers' Industrial Union, John Magnus Clarke was seen to be the force that would pull 
the farmers into the Comintern's orbit.ZZ But he was to dissapoint the Party's hopes for 
Clarke was not only an unwilling resident of Saskatoon, but also too gifted a socialist thinker 
to become the docile instrument of the CPC' s policies. From the outset, Clarke strove to 
acquire a firsthand understanding of agricultural conditions irrespective of the Party line. 23 
From his cramped office-apartment on the second floor of the Grainger Building in 
downtown Saskatoon, Clarke churned out a steady flow of polemic which developed with 
his research discoveries. He quickly realized that the Comintem's approach to the agrarian 
question was inapplicable to the Canadian context and he criticized Party ideologues who 
attempted to make the "facts fit into an existing theory. " 24 In a series of "Draft Agrarian 
Programs" and in his editorials in The Furrow, Clarke moved to correct the inaccuracies 
in the Communist Party's policy . Thus he began a process that might have transformed 
ll!. A copy of the "Draft Thesis on the Agrarian Question" may be found in The Communist, X (De-
cember 1931): 1047-52; an abridged version was first printed in Canada in the Western Clarion , 16 May 1921. 
19. PAC, CPC Papers, Convention Series, "Minutes of the Sixth National Convention of the Com-
munist Party of Canada, 1929" , p. 16. 
20. Public Archives of Ontario (PAO), CPC Records , Box 14, file I , H.M. Bartholomew, "The 
Agrarian Question in Canada" (n .d.). 
21. RCMP Records, FUL file, The Furrow, p. 3. 
22. Canadian Tribune, 14 June 1972. 
23. In 1927, Clarke headed a "Research Board" of the PFEL "for the purpose of gathering and filing 
all available statistics relative to agriculture.'' Through this agency, he developed his understanding of the prairie 
economy. TheFurrow,22July 1927. 
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the communist movement into the leading agent of agrarian dissent. His contribution was 
two-fold, for in creating an attractive programme of struggle for the impoverished fanners, 
he also developed what remains among the most insightful and original analyses of the 
process of capitalist development in Canadian agriculture. 
II 
According to Clarke, the problem with the Comintern's approach to the agrarian 
question was that it based the mobilization of the rural poor on two fundamental miscon-
ceptions: the direct class exploitation of small by large fanners and the harmony of interest 
between the debt-ridden producers and the agricultural proletariat. 25 Clarke asserted that 
an optimistic concentration upon mobilizing farm workers ignored the overwhelming 
difficulties involved in their organization. Farm labour in Canada was migratory and sea-
sonal in character; generally it worked the woods of B.C. and northern Alberta, the cities, 
mines and railroads of the west, and when the demand warranted, the wheat fields at harvest 
time. All efforts to mobilize migrant workers had been undermined by this geographical 
dispersion and Clarke had sufficient experience with the mobility of lumber work to ap-
preciate the difficulties involved. Furthermore, an alliance of small farmers and workers 
was infeasible because of the mechanization process which aggravated the conflicts implicit 
in contractual employment. Mechanization created a deflationary price pressure which 
effectively undermined the economic position of the non-competitive small fanners. Unable 
to limit unit production costs by technological adaption, the poor fanners were compelled 
to lower overheads by reducing expenditures on labour. Rather than drawing small fanner 
and worker together, the dynamics of capitalism increased tensions by forcing the employer 
to assume a progressively more exploitive attitude towards his employees. In this sense, 
the poor producers and the farm workers confronted each other not as allies, but " as class 
enemies, as exploiter and exploited. " 26 
In addition to criticizing the Comintem's depiction of the rural proletariat, Clarke 
attacked the belief that the class struggle in the countryside was derived from the direct 
exploitation of the " poor peasants" by the " kulaks". Though he did not deny the existence 
of ' 'class'' conflict in the rural community, he proposed that its clear expression was muted 
by a pervasive bourgeois ethic. In his view, all farmers were deluded by a Tumerian "free 
land myth' ' which served to muffle social conflict and maintain an illusion of unlimited 
economic expansion and upward mobility . One consequence of the dichotomy between 
this myth and the reality of rural life was that the ideology of the lowest stratum of fanners 
"wavers between that of the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and finds its expression 
in a multitude of demands for more or less utopian reforms". 27 This ideological misper-
ception was anchored in the particular character of agrarian class relations which were a 
product not of internal but of indirect conflicts. ''The theory that in Western Canada, rich 
fanners directly exploit poor fanners is a delusion," Clarke wrote. "It does not exist except 
in the very few isolated cases where a fanner has bought up a considerable amount of land 
and then rented this land to his less fortunate neighbours, or in the even fewer cases where 
25 . Canadian Labor Monthly, March 1929; The Worker, 16 March 1929. 
26. University of Toronto Library (UTL). Robert Kenney Collection, Box 9, file: Agrarian Reform, 
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a rich farmer holds a mortgage on a poor farmer's land. " 28 Altering the focus of analysis, 
he then argued that rather than exploiting each other, all farmers were at the mercy of the 
finance capitalist and that the different positions each class of farmer occupied in relation 
to the urban bourgeoisie determined its social interests. 
"Usury", Clarke wrote, "is the main avenue for the control of agriculture, the toiling 
farmers and their families by the lords of finance. This control extends to all sections of 
the rural population and includes the rural bourgeoisie. " 29 But while similarly enslaved 
by finance capitalism, the rich farmer, in contrast to the poor farmer, was ''the class rep-
resentative of finance capital.' ' 30 This paradoxical situation was produced, according to 
Clarke, by the degree to which the rich farmers profited from the dominationof the urban 
capitalist. While poor farmers were unable to pay the interest charges on debts and mort-
gages, and suffered evictions and foreclosures, wealthy farmers profited from their loss. 
Decreases in the number of small producers meant that rich farmers could expand their 
holdings, improve the cost effectiveness of their machinery, and thereby increase the 
productivity of their operations. Furthermore, large farmers benefited from the credit 
system, which allowed them to borrow the necessary money to continue expanding and 
they shared with the urban bourgeoisie a common interest in technological innovation. 
Clarke saw these divergent interests reflected in the policies of the various farm organi-
zations, for ''it is chiefly inside of these bodies that the clash finds its expression.'' Within 
organizations such as the UFA and the UFC(SS), "the rich farmers advocate policies which 
coincide with their class interests, and the class interests of the rich farmer are almost in-
variably the opposite of the class interests of the poor farmer. '' 31 
The object of communist agitation in the countryside, Clarke asserted, was the 
mobilization of the poor farmers for militant struggle. However, owing to the indirect nature 
of class rivalries, he rejected the Comintem's belief in the direct struggle between rich and 
poor farmers and instead argued that the real battle for economic emancipation must be 
fought against the finance capitalists. Clarke believed that the farmers should be induced 
to organize a general resistance to foreclosures and evictions, which he argued was similar 
to that of taking strike action in industry. He further advocated that the radicals adopt a 
programme calling for the issuance of interest-free state credit, the legislation of a standard 
price for all agricultural commodities based on the small farmers' cost of production, the 
abolition of the Board of Grain Commissioners and the control of the grading process by 
the farmers themselves. 32 
Clarke's agrarian thesis was a sharp departure from the official policy of the Com-
munist Party and it was clearly designed to align revolutionary theories with existing 
conditions. 33 Noting that the poor farmers did not see the rich farmers as their enemies, 
he charged that radicals must reveal to them the subtle collusions inherent in agricultural 
economics. He understood the antipathy between the farmers and their employees, and 
he recognized the difficulties which the Party would face in attempting to bridge their di-
28. lJIL, Kermey Collection, Box 9, Agrarian Reform, J.M. Clarke, "Memo on the Agrarian Question 
for Comrade Morris", p. 3. 
29. UTL, Kenney Collection, Morris and Clarke, "Draft Agrarian Program ... " , p. 7. 
30. UTL, Kenney Collection, Clarke, "Memo on the Agrarian Question ... ", p. 4. 
31. lbid.,p.5. 
32. UTL, Kenney Collection, Morris and Clarke, "Draft Agrarian Program ... ", p. 45 . 
33 . For an alternate view see Ivan AVAKUMOVIC, "The Communist Party of Canada and the Prarie 
Farmer", p. 79; or Norman PENNER, The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis (ScarlJorougb: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 
pp. 82-84. 
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vergent interests. Perceiving the basic conservatism of the small fanner, he argued that the 
radicals must design a progranune of immediate demands that would be ' 'objective enough 
to lead the farmers to struggle and, at the same time, evade the pitfalls of reformism.'' 34 
He knew that the poor farmers had not developed a revolutionary consciousness despite 
their "rising discontent" and he emphasized that for all their militancy, they continued 
to be "beclouded with all the usual humbug, though perhaps to a lesser degree than 
formerly .' ' 35 
In October, 1930, the leaders of the Fanners' Educational League transformed their 
organization into a "militant body" designed to unify "debt-ridden farmers around a 
program of immediate action and united struggle. '' 36 The Furrow was given a more ag-
gressive tone and prominent socialists began elaborating Clarke's call for "committees of 
action, pledged to resist any attempt to throw debt-ridden fanners out of house and home''. 37 
Pressure for a change in League strategy had been accumulating for some time; the demand 
had been increasing for the PFEL to ''adapt ... to the situation'' by separating itself from 
the established farm organizations- the UFA in Alberta and the UFC (SS) in Saskatch-
ewan- and launching a direct "appeal to the people. " 38 The stimulus for the League's 
reorientation came both from the Communist Party, which had adopted a progranune calling 
for greater direct involvement in the fanners' movement, and from the Depression, which 
had created the conditions demanding "radical change" . Radicals across the country 
predicted that the Depression signalled "the breakdown of the capitalist economy" and 
they moved to develop strategies which would prepare the select ''for their future eman-
cipation''. 39 For John Magnus Clarke it seemed as though the long years of journalistic 
agitation were finally reaching fruition . ''There is no doubt about the rising tide of discontent 
of the Prairies,'' he confided in his old friend, Tom McEwan, ''it compensates for living 
in this howling wilderness for three and a half years . " 40 With great vigour, the revolu-
tionaries seized the opportunity and moved to transform the poor fanners' reviving militancy 
into class war. 
Since the First World War, the position of the small farmers in Western Canada had 
been steadily deteriorating. As Clarke realized, the crux of the small farm problem was 
that the unit of a quarter-section, and in many cases of a half-section, was unable to produce 
wheat on a competitive basis with the larger, more mechanized and cost-efficient farms. 
As one western economist noted, ''because the price of wheat is [being] forced down ... 
by the lower selling possible on the larger acreage .. . reasonable returns on a half-section 
cannot be assured. " 41 The industrialization of wheat farming was creating a situation under 
which an individual's income was directly linked to the size of his unit operation. 42 By the 
34. UTL, Kenney Collection, Morris and Clarice, "Draft Agrarian Program ... ", p. 39. 
35. PAO, CPC Records, 1A0530, J.M. Clarice to Tom McEwan, 17 December 1930. 
36. The Furrow, November 1930. 
37 . TheFurrow,Octoberl930. 
38. The Furrow, 30 April1930. 
39. G. VAN HOlliEN, Canoda's Party ofSocinlism: History of the Communist Party ofCanoda, 1921· 
1976 (Toronto: Progress Books, 1982), p. 90; PAC CPC Papers, Convention Series, "Sixth Plenum of the Central 
Executive Committee: Resolutions of the Enlarged Plenum" , February 1931, p. 35; The Furrow, November 
1930. 
40. PAO, CPC Records, IA0530, J.M. Clarice to Tom McEwan, 17 December 1930. 
41 . Glenbow-Aiberta Institute (GAl) , Walter Norman Smith Papers, Box 2, tile 26, A.H. Brinkman 
toJ .G. Gardiner, 7 December 1939. 
42. S.C. HuDSON, "Factors Affecting the Success of Mongage Loans in Western Canada" (Ottawa: 
King's Printers, 1935), pp. 26-27; R.W. MURCHIE, Agricultural Progress on the Prairie Frontier (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1936), pp. 218-40 and 260. 
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early thirties, analysts were concluding that a one hundred and sixty acre farm was unable 
to meet its operating costs without a diversification into dairying or market gardening. 43 
For the administrators of Saskatchewan's Debt Adjustment Board, the position of the 
smaller farmers was quite simply "hopeless" and they grieved over their inability to develop 
a "debt paying capacity. " 44 Lacking in an income adequate to meet expenses, the small 
operator was unable to maintain his equipment or risk experimenting with new technological 
innovations. Consequently, his economic position worsened over time and his continued 
existence carne increasingly to depend upon his creditors' tolerance. 
Not surprisingly, small farmers became militant during periods of economic inst-
ability, when credit was tight and prices were falling . The first outbreak of mass unrest carne 
in the early twenties, when the FUC led a resistance to foreclosure movement and called 
for a moratorium on debt. The protest was short-lived, however, for with the economic 
recovery of 1924-25, the movement collapsed and the FUC was absorbed into the Sas-
katchewan Grain Growers' Association. In June, 1929, the Wheat Pools announced that 
they would be forced to reduce their initial payments to an unprecedented low of sixty cents 
a bushel and six months later, the price had fallen to such a level that the Western premiers 
could petition Ottawa to peg wheat at only seventy cents. 45 Small farmers, whose costs 
of production exceeded the value of their goods, found themselves again confronted by 
the problem of having to pay previously acquired fixed charges with sharply declining 
incomes. Confidence in rapid recovery faded quickly. As one farmer remarked, "there 
has been no time during the twenty-four years we have been in Canada, that the moral [sic] 
of country folk have been so low. " 46 
Familiar faces, whose appearance was the traditional harbinger of revolt, began to 
reappear on the Prairie. In Alberta, George Bevington, the monetary reformer who had 
first made a name for himself in the radical days of the early twenties, ''began to stage a 
come-back'' , and he stumped the Province with a call for the nationalization of the banks 
and a moratorium on farm debt. 47 Far to the east, in Kelvington, Saskatchewan, a much 
radicalized Louis P. McNamee emerged from retirement and unsuccessfully attempted to 
organize a National Farmers' Union, a movement pledged to the resistance of foreclosures, 
the ' ' nationalization of money '' , and socialism. 48 
In December, 1930, the communists moved to harness this rising discontent through 
the formation of the Farmers' Unity League (R.JL), an independent, militant replacement 
for the Educational League. At a series of conferences held on successive days in Winnipeg, 
Regina, Saskatoon and Edmonton, the revolutionaries set out their programme of struggle. 
The ideology of the new organization reflected Clarke's theories on the class division in 
agriculture and presented the poor farmers as the "sole power in country districts for the 
struggle against all forms of capitalism." The League's immediate demands included a 
minimum income of one thousand dollars to be paid by the state, free medicine and hos-
pitals, non-contributory social insurance and old age pensions and a moratorium on farm 
43. Baldur KRISTJANSON, " Land Settlement in Northeastern Alberta" (Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wisconsin, 1949), p. 50. 
44. SAB, George Edwards Papers, George Edwards, "The Problem of the Quarter-Section Farm" 
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debt. 49 The League's strategy was the brain-child of Jack Clarke and his distinctive vision 
of agrarian economics. Unfortunately, it was not to be implemented without a struggle. 
Socialists protested from the outset against Clarke's attempts to dilute the League's agitation 
and called for a more doctrinaire application of the Leninist line. George Williams, who 
had left the PFEL in 1928 when it failed to officially endorse his nomination for the pres-
idency of the UFC(SS), attacked the communists for their preoccupation with the "im-
mediate struggle''. Calling for ''scientific socialism'' and not militancy, Williams urged 
the two hundred and fifty farmers attending the Saskatoon Foundation Conference of the 
FUL not to be obsessed with local issues, but to search for comprehensive political solutions. 
Williams had failed to consider the real character of the new movement, however, and his 
appeal was rebuffed. 50 Economically anxious and socially excoriated, the poor farmers 
who joined the FUL were ·not concerned with achieving the cooperative commonwealth, 
but rather with preventing their expulsion from agriculture. They were interested not in 
revolutionizing society but in saving their homes. Realizing this, the communists eagerly 
sought to build the FUL into a potent instrument of small farm dissent. The challenge was 
to be whether they could transform that dissent into class-conscious struggle. It was on this 
battleground that Prairie communism would stand or fall. 
III 
In Moscow, everyone was perturbed. For years, the International had been pestering 
the Toronto leadership of the CPC to develop a programme of struggle for the countryside, 
but no one had expected anything like this. In early October, 1930, Stewart Smith, Canadian 
communism's seemingly permanent contribution to the International, had received a copy 
of J .M. Clarke's "Draft Agrarian Program" from Tim Buck, the new General Secretary 
of the CPC. Smith, whose mind had already benefited from too many lessons at Moscow's 
Lenin School, was understandably shocked by Clarke's approach. "I feel ... it has to be 
rewritten from the first to the last line,'' he told Buck, and he then dutifully presented the 
document to the Krestintem, the reigning authority on agrarian socialism. 51 As Smith had 
expected, the delegates to the Peasant International were exceedmgly disturbed by Clarke's 
discussion of the agrarian problem and they hastily warned the executive of the CPC to 
revise the "Draft Program". 52 It was, Smith explained, studded with "great shortcomings 
and gross deviations," and it revealed all the "opportunistic theories" and "basic deviations 
of Comrade Clarke." For the communist ideologues, Clarke had committed the venal sin 
of reviving the ''old opportunistic theory of the class antagonism between the proletariat 
and the poor farmer'' and he had further dishonoured himself by advocating debt adjust-
ment, state credit and a minimum farm wage. This, Smith cautioned, was little other than 
"pink reformism" and he advised Buck to remember that "the only solution we have to 
offer [the farmers] ... is the abolition of capitalism. " 53 
49. The Furrow, January 1931. 
50. Interview withJ .L. Phelps, 16January 1983; PAO, CPC Records, IA0530, J .M. Clarke to Tom 
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53. PAC, CPC Papers, file: Tim Buck, Correspondence, 1930-31, Stewart Smith to Tim Buck, 20 
October 1930. 
RETHINKING PRAIRIE COMMUNISM 109 
Greatly embarrassed, the Central Executive of the Party bowed to the Krestintem's 
wisdom and removed Clarke from the editorship of The Furrow, dispatching him to 
Moscow for rest and reorientation. 54 Clarke's dismissal in June, 1931, was to prove dis-
astrous to the CPC's agrarian work, for without his guidance, the Farmers' Unity League 
swiftly atomized. All those best suited to replace him at the League's ideological fulcrum 
were removed from the revolutionary scene within a year of his departure. Hugh Bartho-
lomew, who was the Party's only experienced farm journalist despite his previous intel-
lectual deviation, committed suicide in the summer of 1931 , tonnented by charges of child 
molesting. 55 One year later, Carl Axelson, the founder of the PFEL, shot himself in the 
head in an Edmonton hotel room. 56 The other leaders were on their way out of the move-
ment; N.H. Schwarz was working as a hotel clerk in B.C., Ernie Bolton was reading up 
on Major Douglas, and George Stirling was organizing the nascent CCF. Those whore-
mained lacked both the socialist training of their departed brethren and the capacity to 
formulate an attractive ideological synthesis. Fred Schunaman, who replaced Clarke as 
the editor of The Fu"ow, was an energetic worker, but he neither understood the processes 
of agricultural economics, nor possessed the propagandistic skills necessary to encourage 
the farmers' radical vision. Of the other League members, only Walter Wiggins and 
Hopkins Mills were sufficiently acquainted with the socialist approach to undertake the 
task of leading the FUL. An immigrant from Glamorganshire, Mills was a formidable 
platform speaker and an outstanding agitator, but his writing ability was limited and his 
organizational skills were questionable. 57 Wiggins, the League's president, was an Irish 
Canadian from Western Ontario, who having served in the Fort Gary Horse in the Great 
War, became converted to socialism by the Ganong brothers while homesteading near 
Sturgis. 58 A kind and sincere man of considerable personal charm, he was extremely ef-
fective when forging grass roots contacts. But Wiggins was not a man suited to the drudgery 
of preparing educational propaganda; his thinking was not systematic and his radical in-
vective was a product not of his mind but of his heart. 59 Though the League continued to 
generate an emotional intensity after 1931 , it did not succeed in maintaining its ideological 
depth . Unquestionably, the CPC was in large measure responsible for this situation, for 
after the Party repudiated Clarke's programme, it again lost interest in the agrarian work 
and failed to propose an alternate policy. 60 Having been stripped of its leadership and 
programme, the FUL lost its creative will. The League gave up trying to tailor communism 
to western realities and consequently its ideological message became increasingly irrelevant. 
Although the FUL continued to be successful at the local level, the basic inapplicability 
of its Moscow-conceived programme meant that it was never able to make communism 
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attractive to its supporters. Thus, the FUL degenerated into a mechanism for militant 
struggle rather than class war, and condemned by this limited role, it became not so much 
a leader in the fight for the cooperative commonwealth as a follower in the poor farmers' 
revolt. 
This ideological castration was reflected in the weakness and decentralization of the 
FUL' s organizational structure. Restricted by a shortage of funds and a deficiency of trained 
organizers, the League relied upon a loose network of independent committees of action. 
These local units were often completely isolated from each other and despite the efforts 
of League organizers to group the committees into "districts" or "regional" councils, no 
unifying structure was ever established. 61 The constant "lack of coordination among units" 
resulted in a "sense of isolation" among members "which tends to lead to a feeling of 
weakness." As Tom McEwan, the general-secretary of the Workers' Unity League, 
complained during one of his periodic supervisory trips to the west on behalf of the CPC, 
"large numbers of units in our districts are absolutely isolated from each other. ... The 
central office [of the FUL] appears to recognize the need for Councils of Action [to centralize 
local activities] but they have never taken the steps to translate the theory into action ... 
and most of the units do not understand the purpose and work of the Councils of Action. " 62 
Given this decentralization, it is hardly surprising that League organizers never even knew 
the actual size of the membership in the movement. Schunarnan calculated the readership 
of The Furrow to be around two thousand, though he had to admit that many subscribers 
were not members of the FUL. 63 That this weakness was a product of the organization's 
own structural and philosophical deficiencies is revealed in the fact that there was consid-
erable popular sympathy for the communists which the FUL was simply unable to capitalize 
upon fully . In the Athabaska by-election of February, 1932, Carl Axelson polled over 
twenty three hundred votes, winning fifteen percent of the total and helping defeat the in-
cumbent Liberal candidate. Two months later, a League "Farm Relief Petition" containing 
twelve thousand signatures was presented to R.B. Bennett, and in some areas as many as 
eight hundred farmers would gather under FUL auspices to prevent a tax sale or hold a penny 
auction.64 
The FUL was at its most effective in the revitalization of the old FUC idea of resisting 
foreclosures with "binder twine sales" and "penny auctions". Crowds of obstructionist 
farmers closed off admission routes to the sales and thereby controlled the bidding without 
directly challenging the authorities. Often, no bidders but friends of the debtor were present; 
ridiculously low bids were offered and the sold property was returned to its previous 
owner. 65 The nucleus of this anti-foreclosure activity was the small farm area of the Park 
Belt, but demonstrations against mortgage sales speckled the map of the entire Prairie. 
Clearly, the resistance movement was a direct consequence of depressed conditions; the 
FUL did little more than provide a name to a spontaneous impulse. Nonetheless, the role 
of the League should not be underestimated. No other farm group condoned the extra-legal 
methods farmers used when dealing with forced sales, and without League support, local 
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organization would have been far more difficult. The problem for the communists was that 
while farmers joined the FUL locals. When protesting against the banks and trust com-
panies, they would not listen to communist propaganda. In large measure this was because 
the CPC's farm programme, with its references to kulaks, its concentration on the rural 
worker, and its faith in land collectivization, had little attraction for the dirt farmer. 
But for the poor farmers, a policy of simple resistance was not enough. Opposing 
foreclosures could not alter the grim realities of impoverishment and debt. Ruined by falling 
prices and legally defenceless against their creditors, many farmers were ready to consider 
a more revolutionary solution to their economic problems. " .The outlook for the Western 
farmer is certainly blue,'' wrote one observer in 1931 , ''and it may be necessary to tinge 
it with red before justice is done to him. '' 66 But the FUL remained unmoved. The Party 
was committed to the urban struggle and criticized the League's work. Isolated even among 
front organizations, the FUL failed to develop a sense of its own legitimacy. It could only 
heighten the intensity of existing agitations in favour of a moratorium on debt. Unfortu-
nately, this form of propaganda did little to improve League fortunes, though it did perhaps 
produce psychological victories for the farmers. Confronted by incessant demands for debt 
relief, many Western politicians became convinced that the League was stronger than it 
seemed, and that the farmers were ''in a revolutionary frame of mind and find nothing good 
in what we have done or tried to do. " 67 This did not, however, effect a change in gov-
ernment policy. For Premier Brownlee of Alberta, individual negotiation and personal 
restraint were the only reasonable solutions to the debt problem and he refused to announce 
a general moratorium. 68 J .M. T. Anderson's Cooperative Government was no more anxious 
to pass comprehensive protective legislation. Though a Debt Adjustment Board was es-
tablished in Saskatchewan in 1935, its powers were limited. Of 1683 petitions from creditors 
requesting the right to foreclose, 956 were allowed by the Debt Adjustment Board and a 
full two-thirds were approved over the opposition of the debtor. ffJ The failure of the FUL 
to either effect a change in the laws or bring about the revolution led many League members 
to abandon the penny auction movement and search for other methods of defending their 
interests. Increasing numbers of radicals abandoned the League, some drifting to Social 
Credit, others reviving Clarke's call for a guaranteed wheat price and a minimum agri-
cultural wage. 70 
The Rumsey local of the FUL was the first to propose the calling of a farm strike to 
protest "against the intolerable conditions under which the poor farmers are forced to live." 
Petitioning the League office in December, 1932, the Rumsey radicals asserted that a mass 
"non-production strike" would be the most effective weapon in the struggle "against the 
relentless robbery of the banks, through the Provincial and MuniCipal authorities, [and of] 
the mortgage and machine companies." Fred Schunarnan, The Furrow's editor, was drawn 
immediately to the idea, but he cautioned that there was more than one variety of strike 
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action which could be taken. Schunaman suggesled that the fanners could choose between 
non-production, which meant a curtailment of the acreage sown to wheat; non-delivery, 
or the picketing of elevators and the prevention of grain sales until demands were met; and 
non-payment, which implied the sale of produce and a refusal to pay creditors, accompanied 
by a resistance to seizures and foreclosures. 71 The Rumsey fanners' suggestion inauguraled 
a lively debate in the pages of The Furrow which only subsided when the FUL called a 
conference to decide upon what type of strike action to endorse. 72 Unfortunately there is 
no record of whether the strike convention was ever held, for the League soon was dealt 
a devastating blow. In May, 1933, The Furrow's credit at the printers was curtailed, its 
office in the Grainger Building was closed, and for the next eight months it was forced to 
cease publication. 73 Without access to The Furrow it is impossible to c~ League activities. 
Only a few facts surface: in June, 1933, an FUL candidate contested the Mackenzie by-
election in Saskatchewan, and four months later the League sponsored a Hunger March 
on the Regina Legislature. 74 The League, however, must have had some success popu-
larizing its strike idea, despite the demise of its organ, for one year after the Rumsey local 
first broached the idea, a farm strike was held in Northern Alberta. 
IV 
The center of League activity in Alberta was the predominantly Ukrainian farming 
area between Edmonton and the Saskatchewan border. Farms in this region were smaller 
than elsewhere on the Prairie, with quarter- and half-section production units predominating. 
Owing to the forested nature of the terrain and the difficulties involved in clearing, the 
proportion of improved to total acreage was significantly less than the western average. 
Investment ratios in farm machinery and livestock were among the lowest in Alberta, with 
a tradition of non-competitiveness exacerbating the simple financial difficulties involved 
in modernization. 75 Here, low earnings and an escalating level of indebtedness were the 
salient features of economic life throughout the Depression. Over half of the farms in the 
area reporled mortgage indebtedness in 1931 and within the quinquennium the number of 
debtors in the region exceeded that of any other census district of Alberta by five hundred 
percent. The total amount of debt in this small farm belt was $15,650,500 in 1930, an 
average of$2,780 per mortgaged unit. By 1935, the average debt had fallen slightly, but 
the number indebted had increased by twenty percent. This burden was made more un-
bearable by the astonishingly low value of the agricultural products sold. In 1930, the sale 
of farm products brought an average income of $1,216 to each operator and within five 
years that amount had fallen to only $850. In short, the average farmer at the outset of the 
Depression earned barely enough to pay forty-three percent of his debt and by 1935, he 
could cover only one-third of his crop liens and mortgages with his total income. When 
amounts are deducted for production costs and familial subsistence, the income of local 
farmers was insufficient to pay for even the interest on farm debts. 76 
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Tensions caused by this financial situation finally erupled during the 1933 harvest, 
when a dispute developed between the farmers ofMyrnam and the local elevator agents. 
The problem arose in mid-November, when a rumour circulated among the farmers that 
the five elevators in Myrnam had been instructed to grade all grains delivered as poor in 
quality or ''tough''. Complaints had immediately been lodged with the Board of Grain 
Commissioners, but the companies in question had successfully disproved the charges by 
producing receipts demonstrating that they had purchased ''dry'' high quality wheat after 
November 15, when the charges had been made. 77 The rumours persisted, however, and 
on 4 December, 140 farmers voled to boycott the elevators until a formal investigation had 
been undertaken by the Grain Commissioners and until the local agents had been replaced 
by the elevator companies. A strike committee was established, roads leading to the el-
evators were picketed and an appeal for support was sent out to both the United Farmers 
of Alberta and to the Farmers' Unity League. 78 
Paradoxically, despite front-page coverage in major Alberta newspapers, it took 
nearly a month for the Board of Grain Commissioners to dispatch an investigatory legation 
to the Myrnam area. In early January, 1934, Commissioners Blatchford, Thompson and 
Creighton appeared with representatives of the grain companies and an officer of the RCMP 
to inform the farmers that although they sympathized with their demands, "the Board of 
Grain Commissioners has no power to act in this case as it is up to the companies represenled 
here to take the necessary steps. " 79 By week's end, the Mounted Police had moved into 
the area and the farmers' pickets had been forcibly dispersed. 80 Angered by the Govern-
ment's intervention, the strike committee attempted to broaden its protest by making a bid 
for the support of the UFA. Although few in the Myrnam area were UFA members and 
although the Association had previously ignored the committee's appeal for support, the 
strike leaders were clearly hoping to pressure the Brownlee government by threatening its 
power-base in the Uniled Farmers organization. On 17 January, a Ukrainian named William 
Hal ina appeared before the UF A convention in Calgary and appealed in English to the 
delegates for support. Denying the presence of both ''agitators'' and ''communists'', Halina 
explained that the Myrnam farmers wanted only to have the offending elevator agents re-
moved "~ause we have lost faith in them." Vocal opposition to the strike immediately 
became manifest as one delegate after another rose to explain that as ''a director of one of 
the companies named", he objected to the "charges of unjust practices." Tactfully, the 
convention avoided an outbreak of hostilities by appointing an ''impartial committee'' to 
research into the Myrnam strike, though the predisposition of the delegates was revealed 
in the fact that of the three individuals appointed to investigate the dispute, one was a 
member of the provincial legislature and another was a director of one of the companies 
involved.8 1 The investigatory report, submitted three days later, denied the existence of 
unfair grading at Myrnam, though the committee admitted that owing to time constraints 
it had based its conclusions solely on evidence volunteered to it by the Department of 
Agriculture, the Board of Grain Commissioners and the companies involved. 82 The theories 
of J.M. Clarke were being corroborated; the interests of the wealthy, share-holding ag-
riculturalists were not those of the poor farmers. Soon after the UFA rejecled the Myrnam 
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fanners' appeal a settlement was reached between the strike committee and the grain 
companies. Several of the local agents were replaced by the companies and in exchange, 
the strikers dropped their charges of low grading and abandoned their demand for a reim-
bursement by the companies for all grains "undersold". On 11 March, 1934, Western 
Canada's first farm delivery strike came quietly to a close. 83 
Throughout the Mymam strike, the role of the Fanners' Unity League remained 
obscure. Lacking in funds and hard pressed by its creditors, the League headquarters was 
unable to lend any organizational support to the strikers. Assistance might have been 
provided by local units since League members had been the first to debate the strike idea 
and many FUL branches existed in the Mymam area. But the link remains unsubstantiated. 
Clearly, though it would be rash to discount the communist element, their importance should 
not be exaggerated. That Halina could deny the presence of communist agitators is indicative 
of their isolation. The delivery strike, which had begun as a left-wing idea, had become 
a tool of non-communist farm militancy. Poor farmers were willing to use the Farmers' 
Unity League, but not to obey it. 
Nonetheless, if the communists can be faulted for their failure to lead the strike, the 
United Fanners of Alberta was guilty of directly opposing it. The Brownlee govenunent's 
response to the unrest at Mymam was repression. The RCMP was sent into the area with 
the simple objective of opening highways and restoring order as swiftly as possible. The 
reaction of the UF A association was no more laudatory, for the delegates at its convention 
displayed a complete lack of sympathy for the strikers. Gradually, small fanners concluded 
that the UF A had become an organization representing only the grain companies and the 
larger fanners of the southern Prairie, a realization that may have contributed to the spread 
of Social Credit doctrine and the defection of UF A voters in the small farm regions in the 
1935 provincial election. 84 What is remarkable about the Mymam strike is that despite its 
isolation, the strike committee effectively maintained its boycott on grain deliveries for 
over three months. The secret to the strikers' solidarity lay in their continued use of elevators 
outside of the picketed area. 85 To this extent, the strike remained solid because it was not 
a strike at all but rather a boycott of selected elevator companies. This fact escaped the 
farmers, however, and many of them became convinced that the Mymam protest was a 
promising experiment in a new form of popular dissent. Moderate concessions had been 
obtained through limited action and poor fanners and their communist supporters concluded 
that the strike would have been more successful had its geographical area been extended. 
Before the year was out, the Mymam fanners were given an opportunity to test their theory. 
v 
Alberta' s second farm delivery strike began at Mundare, a town lying some eighty 
kilometers south-west of Mymam, in early November, 1934. Unlike their predecessors, 
however, the Mundare strikers evidently devised their protest to be more than a local dis-
turbance, for they sought to ameliorate the conditions of the poor fanners across the 
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mortgage belt. Directing their first strike petition not to the middlemen but to the provincial 
govenunent, the Mundare strike committee demanded that the elevator companies install 
grain cleaners at their own expense at all points, that a cost of production minimum price 
for all farm products be legislated, and that a more "equitable" system of grading bees-
tablished. 86 By emphasizing the need for better methods of grading and free grain cleaning, 
the protesters were hoping to improve the price of their wheat by eliminating the possibility 
that they would be under-paid by the elevator agents. In the Park Belt region, the quality 
of wheat was more varied and generally lower than it was in the smith. In this area one-
quarter of the grain delivered was regularly graded as tough by the purchasing agents. 87 
Since the grading system stressed such characteristics as colour and plumpness of the kernel, 
the cleanness of the grain was often crucial if the farmer was to obtain the correct price 
for his wheat. 88 Large producers generally owned their own cleaners, but poor farmers could 
not afford to install their own systems and they often found it impossible to pay the elevator 
agent for the cost of the service, even where it was available. 89 Consequently, many small 
farmers believed the agents used the impurities in their grain as a means of lowering the 
purchasing price by down-grading wheat qualities. Thus the Mundare strikers' demands 
represented more than local concerns, they represented the small farmers' desire to achieve 
justice for their industry. 
The delivery strike began on 6 November 1934, when 400 farmers gathered at 
Mundare town hall to prepare a petition of grievances. Detachments of eight to ten men 
were sent out to patrol the major highways and picket lines were established around the 
local elevators. 90 Vegreville's Chief Inspector Scott, of the RCMP, immediately moved 
police units into the area and by the evening of the first day of striking, fourteen farmers 
had been arrested and two had been hospitalized. 91 Scott's impetuous actions probably 
worried the govenunent, for on November 8, the RCMP units in the town were withdrawn 
and Chief Commissioner Blatchford was hurrying towards Mundare from Winnipeg, drawn 
''by the excessive seriousness of the situation.'' The following day, Blatchford met with 
the strikers and explained to them that their protest "was the most futile thing they could 
do'', indicating that their refusal to deliver wheat would have no effect upon prices since 
there was enough surplus grain stored in eastern terminals to feed the country for the next 
three years. Inspector Scott, who accompanied Blatchford, was even more admonitory, 
warning his mostly Ukrainian audience that the RCMP would do everything it could to 
maintain law and order and informing them that they "had a lot to be thankful for in that 
they were living in the British Empire. " 92 Within two days, the strike had spread to en-
compass all of the major shipping points around Mundare, closing some twenty elevators 
in the area between Royal Park and Lamont. 93 By 14 November, farmers in Willingdon, 
Hairy Hill, Smokey Lake, Two Hills, Kaleland and Manville had joined in non-delivery 
and had recognized the authority of the Mundare leadership as the provincial strike com-
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mittee. 94 Sixty elevators had been closed by this time and the strikers confidently predicted 
that their protest would paralyze trading across the whole of central Alberta. 95 
But their optimism was to prove illusory. By I December, grain sales had resumed 
at Hilliard, Mymam and Vegreville, and Grain Commissioner Ramsay reopened Mundare 
with a promise to supervise the grading of all wheat delivered. 96 The provincial strike 
committee attempted to avert the disaster by transforming the protest from non-delivery 
to boycott and it urged farmers to deliver their grain over the platform, thereby avoiding 
the elevators and their agents . 97 The strike leaders in Willingdon sought to revive the 
movement's unity by turning themselves into the executive of a United Farmers of Canada 
(Alberta Section), and they called on poor farmers to join in building a permanent orga-
nization pledged to obtaining the ''costs of production'' through ''direct action''. 98 The 
grain strike was doomed to collapse, however, for it was condemned by an internal 
weakness. Though the delivery strike was the supreme manifestation of the poor farmers' 
ability to cooperate, it was flawed by having as its real victims the strikers themselves and 
not the grain dealers. By not delivering their wheat, the farmers were depriving themselves 
of their only source of income and for small operators already deeply in debt, this implied 
a risk to their ownership and their subsistence. The limited geographical extent of the 
Mymam strike had been the paradoxical source of its strength. By spreading throughout 
Alberta's eastern Park Belt, the Mundare strike ultimately destroyed itself. When all of 
the local points were closed, the farmers were forced into a situation they could not hope 
to control. Unless the strike could have spread rapidly to encompass a majority of the west's 
wheat producing area, it was bound to fail, as the farmers' capacity to endure a curtailment 
of income was far less than that of the major grain companies. Unfortunately, the chances 
of the strike spreading over an extended area in 1934-35 were limited, for across the Prairies 
the "leading farmers" had "declared their intention to disregard the strike entirely." 99 
Organizations dominated by the large farmers, such as the UFA and the Wheat Pool, refused 
to endorse the strike, and the weakness of the FUL in the southern areas of the Prairie re-
stricted the non-delivery action to an isolated area of poverty in the heart of the Park Belt. 100 
For the Farmers' Unity League, the Mundare delivery strike was a final curtain call 
which eased the organization off the revolutionary stage. Prominent Communists had in-
itially hoped that the strike would inaugurate ''a new stage in the development of the im-
poverished farmers ... it signals a definite radicalization of the farming masses; a definite 
swing to the left; a definite growing militancy; a definite breaking with old traditions and 
methods of struggle." 101 Anxious to harness this new movement and make up for the _errors 
committed during the Mymam strike, League organizers had moved swiftly into the strike 
area and had offered their support and guidance to the dissident farmers. John Magnus 
Clarke, recently returned to Canada from his years abroad in the Soviet Union and India, 
was dispatched back to The Furrow's office by a Party convinced now of his indispens-
ability. The Canadian Labour Defence League, the CPC's legal front organization vol-
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unteered to act in the defence of arrested picketers; the FUL offices in Edmonton were 
transformed into the headquarters for the provincial strike committee; and under Clarke's 
supervision, communist organizers canvassed non-strike areas for support and The Furrow 
agreed to publish and distribute the strikers' bulletins and broadsheets. 102 One League 
organizer, George Palmer, even made the headlines in the Edmonton papers when he was 
tarred and feathered by strike breakers after giving a speech in Vegreville. 103 But for all 
their good offices, the communists remained unable to either win converts or fundamentally 
alter the character of the strike. Even at the height of the strike an FUL conference in Ed-
monton attracted only eighty-four farmers, a grim reminder that despite their best efforts 
''the League is extremely sectarian, isolated from the mass of the farmers ... [by] its tra-
ditions no less than by its composition." 104 
VI 
Soon after the Mundare delivery strike, at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Executive 
Committee of the CPC held in Toronto in November, 1935, the decision was made to 
disband the Farmers' Unity League and to fuse its various elements "with the mass reformist 
organizations to which it is ... parallel and in general, in competition." 105 The Party passed 
the resolution eliminating its agrarian wing as part of a general reorientation in favour of 
an anti-fascist "United Front" of radical elements. 106 The League was attacked as "sec-
tarian" and "isolated" and its methods were characterized by the CPC as being "over-
burdened" with "theorizations" and "generalities". 107 The leaders of the FUL drifted into 
a new organization, the Farmers' National Committee of Action (FNCA), a "United Front" 
body that had been established in August, 1935, in anticipation of the discontinuance of 
League activities. The objective of the revised organization was similar to that of the old 
Progressive Farmers' Educational League: the unification of the various radical groups and 
the encouragement of leftist sentiment among the farmers. 108 In short, the new strategy 
was to penetrate and not to oppose the rival protest organizations. But the FNCA failed 
to make any significant impact on the farmers' movement, because its headquarters were 
established in Winnipeg, far from the center of radical activity. True to the form of agrarian 
communism, many of the most successful agitators now began to leave the movement. 
Mills retired from agrarian dissent and moved with his family to Vancouver; Walter Wiggins 
left Saskatoon for Winnipeg to be the secretary of the Alberta Section of the FUL; Bill 
Kardash went to fight in Spain with the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion. 109 J .M. Clarke, 
after working briefly as editor of the short -lived Mid-western C !arion, escaped to B. C. in 
1940 when the rest of the editorial staff was arrested by the RCMP, and lived out the war 
under an assumed name. 110 His last contribution to Canadian radicalism was his editorship 
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of The Canadian Woodworker, the official organ of the Woodworkers ' Industrial Union 
of Canada. 111 By 1936, the communist star over the Prairie had been eclipsed and the re-
volutionaries had manoeuvred themselves into obscurity. 
In many ways , the FUL deserved better; better than the treatment it had received in 
life and better than that accorded to it by posterity . Though the League had failed to win 
poor farmers to communism, it had nonetheless been moderately successful in assuming 
a mantle of farm militancy discarded a half decade earlier. Indeed, for all its communist 
posturing, the FUL in practice was never much more than a revitalized Farmers' Union 
of Canada. Evidently it was similar enough to attract many of the same old activists for 
when the FUL founded a local at Kelvington in 1930, the first name in the lodge book was 
Louis P . McNamee's. 112 As one old radical remarked, "Ah well, you know what Barnum 
said." 11 3 
If the FUL failed , it was because the ideological goals it set for itself were too am-
bitious for both its leaders and its followers, for the League sought not merely to lead a 
struggle, but to change men's thoughts. Having been stripped of its own ideology, the FUL 
imprisoned itself in a doctrinal framework which restricted its ability to lead the small 
farmers against the forces of industrial capitalism. Though the League fought for immediate 
reforms, it alienated its supporters by declaring the very policies it advocated to be insuf-
ficient and ephemeral. As one farm leader noted of the FUL, ''I don ' tknow how to place 
this outfit .. . they make a big noise about the toiling farmer and they knock the UFC. 'They 
profess to be Wheat Pool supporters and yet their activities appear to be opposed to the 
Marketing Act. They support the CCF and yet their organization claims that the CCF is a 
tool of capitalism.'' 114 Ultimately, the FUL was more adept at exposing deceptions and 
leading independently generated protests than it was at evolving a programme which might 
permanently attract the poor farmers. 115 When the demands of the United Front terminated 
the League' s existence, it left not so much a revolutionary consciousness as a vague militant 
enthusiasm. Rather than converting the masses to communism, the FUL succeeded in 
reinforcing their belligerence. Protest, in the years immediately the ~ .)r farmers. 115 When 
the demands of the United Front terminated the League' s existence, it left not so much a 
revolutionary consciousness as a vague militant enthusiasm. Rather than converting the 
masses to communism, the FUL succeeded in reintorcing their belligerence. Protest, in 
the years immediately following the League's demise, found its expression not in support 
for the CPC, but in a revival of small farm militancy in both Alberta and Saskatchewan 
under the auspices of the United Farmers of Canada. It was not an inauspicious legacy, 
only an insufficient one. 
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